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Abstract
Background: In successfully negotiating the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), the World Health
Organization (WHO) has led a significant innovation in global health governance, helping to transform international tobacco
control. This article provides the first comprehensive review of the diverse campaign initiated by transnational tobacco
corporations (TTCs) to try to undermine the proposed convention.
Methods and Findings: The article is primarily based on an analysis of internal tobacco industry documents made public
through litigation, triangulated with data from official documentation relating to the FCTC process and websites of relevant
organisations. It is also informed by a comprehensive review of previous studies concerning tobacco industry efforts to
influence the FCTC. The findings demonstrate that the industry’s strategic response to the proposed WHO convention was
two-fold. First, arguments and frames were developed to challenge the FCTC, including: claiming there would be damaging
economic consequences; depicting tobacco control as an agenda promoted by high-income countries; alleging the treaty
conflicted with trade agreements, ‘‘good governance,’’ and national sovereignty; questioning WHO’s mandate; claiming the
FCTC would set a precedent for issues beyond tobacco; and presenting corporate social responsibility (CSR) as an
alternative. Second, multiple tactics were employed to promote and increase the impact of these arguments, including:
directly targeting FCTC delegations and relevant political actors, enlisting diverse allies (e.g., mass media outlets and
scientists), and using stakeholder consultation to delay decisions and secure industry participation.
Conclusions: TTCs’ efforts to undermine the FCTC were comprehensive, demonstrating the global application of tactics that
TTCs have previously been found to have employed nationally and further included arguments against the FCTC as a key
initiative in global health governance. Awareness of these strategies can help guard against industry efforts to disrupt the
implementation of the FCTC and support the development of future, comparable initiatives in global health.
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The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(FCTC), the first international public health treaty initiated by
the World Health Organization (WHO), arguably represents the
most significant tobacco control initiative to date and has been
central to WHO’s efforts to reestablish its strategic significance.
The treaty constitutes a landmark in global health governance [1],
characterised by complex ‘‘worldwide transboundary interactions’’
and a recognition that global health is shaped by international
organisations, corporations, philanthropists, and civil society, as
well as nation states [2,3] and marks an ambitious and innovative
response to the global tobacco epidemic.
In their drive to maximise shareholder value and global tobacco
consumption, transnational tobacco corporations (TTCs) have
been described as a ‘‘vector’’ of this epidemic [4]. Research to date
has revealed a variety of tactics designed to help TTCs achieve
their goals, including efforts to limit the FCTC’s impact. Articles
focusing on TTCs’ influence on the FCTC have, however,
principally focused on country- or issue-specific case studies and
on documenting specific tactics. In contrast, this paper provides
the first comprehensive review of TTCs’ use of global-level tactics
to undermine the development of the FCTC. The findings will
enhance understanding of obstacles to the effective implementa-
tion of FCTC measures and to the negotiation of FCTC protocols,
and make a contribution to both the development of future
tobacco control initiatives and any comparable global initiatives in
related health issues [5,6,7]. The paper will inform ongoing
debates about the role of corporations in health policy develop-
ment and global governance, particularly in terms of international
agencies’ responses to the global burden of non-communicable
diseases (NCDs) [8].
Methods
This paper is based on analysis of previously confidential
tobacco industry documents made publicly available through
litigation in the United States and is informed by a comprehensive
review of the existing literature concerning TTCs’ strategies to
influence the FCTC. Online searches of the Legacy Tobacco
Documents Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu) were conduct-
ed between May 2008 and February 2009 to identify relevant
documents. Preliminary searches focused on broad terms (e.g.
‘‘Framework Convention on Tobacco Control’’, ‘‘FCTC’’ and
‘‘WHO Convention’’), which informed more specific searches (for
particular names, issues, and events). Searches were undertaken in
English (the language in which the majority of the documents are
written) and German (reflecting Germany’s reputation as a key
tobacco industry ally [9]). In total, over 4,500 documents were
reviewed, of which 1,366 documents were deemed relevant. These
documents were analysed in detail and indexed using EndNote.
This paper draws on a selection of these (84 from British American
Tobacco [BAT], 28 from Philip Morris [PM], five from RJ
Reynolds, and two from Brown and Williamson).
A qualitative, hermeneutic methodology was employed to
analyse the documents [10,11], and the thematic coding frame-
work was developed inductively (employing two major categories
and multiple subcategories). Alongside the thematic analysis, the
documents were organised chronologically to construct a historical
narrative. This analysis was contextualised with additional data
from the websites of industry, consultancy, and other organizations
cited in the documents and official FCTC documentation. Official
documentation from the negotiations was accessed via the WHO
FCTC website (http://www.who.int/fctc/en/) and was supple-
mented by reports from 45 Framework Convention Alliance
(FCA) Bulletins, published at the sessions of the International
Negotiation Body (INB) (http://www.fctc.org/).
Regarding the comprehensive review of the existing published
literature concerning tobacco industry efforts to influence FCTC
negotiations, systematic searches were conducted using the search
terms ‘‘Framework convention on tobacco control’’ OR (FCTC
AND tobacco) between November 2011 and January 2012 in the
following databases: Global Health (CABI, 172 hits), PubMed (140
hits), Web of Knowledge (119 hits), the Centre for Tobacco
Control Research and Education’s e-scholarship website (http://
escholarship.org/uc/ctcre) (96 hits), Applied Social Sciences Index
and Abstracts (ASSIA, 50 hits), and the International Bibliography
of the Social Sciences (IBSS, 13 hits). A total of 590 articles were
retrieved. All abstracts were checked and duplicates were
excluded. Of these, 154 articles were deemed potentially relevant,
so full versions were accessed to allow a detailed review. Relevant
articles were selected according to the following inclusion criteria:
written in English, informed by empirical research (i.e., not just
opinion pieces), and focused on tobacco industry tactics and
arguments to influence the FCTC. These criteria were met by 34
articles. The results from this review provided background and
comparative information for our documentary analysis and are
drawn on in both the results and the discussion.
The methodological approach of the study was approved by the
Research Ethics Committee of the University of Bath’s School for
Health.
Results
Our literature review identified 12 country-specific case studies
showing, for example, how TTCs tried to use their influence on
German politicians to weaken the FCTC [12], cooperated with
the Japanese delegation [13], and managed to obstruct the
implementation of the FCTC in Argentina [14]. A further 22
studies focused on the pursuit of specific tactics, e.g., the
development of voluntary regulation [15] or the use of consultan-
cies [16]. Only ten articles were based on primary research. Many
of the studies identified through this review recognised that the
tactics described existed within a broader comprehensive global
industry strategy to undermine the FCTC negotiations
[12,15,17,18], but none sought to address the complexity of such
a strategy. Hence, this paper represents the first comprehensive
analysis of the extent of TTCs’ tactics to influence the FCTC.
Our documentary analysis revealed that all major TTCs were
considerably alarmed about the FCTC from its initiation
[19,20,21,22] and recognised the need to respond comprehen-
sively [23,24,25,26,27]. This reflected concern about the scope of
the convention, the ‘‘breathtaking’’ [22] progression of develop-
ments, and their potential catalytic effects on national and regional
tobacco control regulation [22]. Having rapidly identified the
proposed convention as an ‘‘unprecedented challenge to the
tobacco industry’s freedom to continue doing business’’ [19], it is
unsurprising that TTCs responded aggressively to this use of
WHO’s constitutional authority. The account below focuses
particularly on BAT’s strategy to counter the FCTC, reflecting
the balance of available documents, BAT’s self-proclaimed status
as the most international tobacco group [28], and the company’s
strengths in developing countries, where industry interests were
perceived as most threatened by the initiative [29].
The Results section is divided into two subsections which
outline the frames and tactics TTCs employed in an FCTC
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documentary data, but the findings from the literature review
are incorporated into Tables 1 and 2 and are drawn on in the
textual discussion where relevant. As it would be impossible to
describe all of the activities relating to each strategy within one
paper, the following sections use examples to illustrate the frames
and tactics identified.
(A) Attempts to frame debates and develop
argumentation against the FCTC. The concept of ‘‘framing’’
describes a strategy based on generating beliefs and ideas that
provide a framework for thinking about an issue [30,31]. Policy
frames have been described as a ‘‘weapon of advocacy’’ [32,117]
which, when successfully applied, can be crucial in shaping policy
[33]. Schattenschneider [34] argues that the definition of political
issues and potential solutions determines who is involved in the
policy process and shapes both the organisation of interests and
the formation of coalitions and alliances. Our searches showed
that numerous potential ways of framing debates around tobacco
control and international regulation were explored by TTCs. We,
however, identified eight core frames that were used in relation to
the FCTC negotiations, which sometimes overlap and are
mutually reinforcing, but nevertheless exhibit distinctive features.
These eight frames are outlined in the following list. A further six
frames were identified in our comprehensive literature review of
publications relating to the FCTC. All 14 frames are presented in
Table 1 and returned to in the Discussion.
(1) Economic impacts: Alleging damaging economic consequences of the
FCTC.
In 1999, a World Bank report demonstrated that economic fears
of tobacco control legislation having negative impacts were largely
Table 1. Tobacco industry frames to influence the FCTC.
Frame Goal
Evidence of
Application
TTC frames identified through the analysis of tobacco
industry documents and a comprehensive literature review
1. Economic impacts: Alleging damaging economic
consequences of the FCTC
To depict tobacco control as detrimental to the economy
and threaten policy makers and politicians; particularly
effective during economic recession
[12,17,36,229]
2. Developing countries: Depicting tobacco as
a high-income country issue
To divert attention away from tobacco control; to
cause and increase dissent and hostility
[17,36,230,231,232]
3. Trade: Claiming conflicts with trade agreements To stall tobacco control initiatives, including regulation of
tobacco ingredients, health warning labels, plain packaging, etc.
[17,233]
4. WHO’s mandate: Questioning WHO’s mandate
to develop a tobacco control treaty
To question the legal basis for tobacco control initiatives
and particularly prevent legislation spanning across national
and regional borders
[12,17]
5. Good governance: Alleging conflicts with principles
of good governance and national sovereignty
To increase opposition against tobacco control and the
policy makers responsible for it; to stall the process of
tobacco control policy making
[230]
6. Sovereignty: Alleging conflicts with national
sovereignty
To make the case that international tobacco control
undermines national sovereignty, including by questioning
the legitimacy of international tobacco control and in so
doing, to raise opposition of nation states
[12,13,230,234]
7. Corporate social responsibility: Presenting CSR as
an alternative to tobacco control policy
To create an illusion of being a ‘‘changed,’’ more socially
responsible company; to regain political and public credibility
[15,96]
TTC frames identified through the analysis of
tobacco industry documents only
8. Precedent: Depicting the FCTC as setting a
precedent for other areas
To enlist allies in debates by claiming relevance to other
health issues and potential implications for other industries
TTC frames identified through a comprehensive
literature review only
9. Legal product: Stressing that tobacco is a legal product To stress that tobacco is a legal product which should be
treated like any other issue
[235]
10. Flexibility: Stressing that tobacco control should be
‘‘flexible’’ and ‘‘appropriate’’
To depict stringent tobacco regulation as rigid and unreasonable [12,13]
11. Extremism: Depicting tobacco control advocates are
extremist, radical, and not credible
To portray tobacco control advocates and their positions as
unacceptable and, by contrast, tobacco industry positions as
moderate and reasonable
[16,230]
12. Personal freedoms: Claiming that tobacco control infringes
on freedom of expression and other personal freedoms,
and states that pass tobacco control are ‘‘nanny states’’
To maintain the tobacco industry’s ability to market their
products; and to maintain the social acceptability of smoking
[12]
13. Harmlessness: Claiming that tobacco is not harmful
to health or its effect is minimal
To cast doubt on the scientific evidence that smoking is health
damaging and play down the seriousness of the health problem
[230]
14. Education: Focusing on youth smoking prevention and
retailer education
To appear to help prevent underage smoking and to
depict smoking as an adult choice, although research
suggests industry-sponsored programmes are usually
ineffective (often linked to CSR programmes)
[15,16,230,236]
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001249.t001
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national economies [35]. The World Bank backed the FCTC
initiative and encouraged governments to employ comprehensive
strategies to curb the epidemic [35]. Nevertheless, the tobacco
industry adopted arguments predicting the FCTC would cause
economic harm, including via lost wages for tobacco farmers,
reduced employment opportunities (particularly in rural areas),
and lost tobacco crop revenue. Such arguments had already been
used to counter national tobacco control initiatives [14,36] but
were now reiterated to raise concerns about the FCTC with
specific member states, including Italy, Greece and Turkey, Brazil,
Argentina, Zimbabwe, India, and Russia [37,38,39]. It was alleged
that the FCTC would be particularly detrimental to tobacco
growing in developing countries. A key role in promoting such
arguments was played by the International Tobacco Growers
Association (ITGA) [19], which was formed by TTCs [40], served
on several occasions as a frontgroup for TTCs [41,42,43] and still
receives funding from PM, BAT, and Imperial Tobacco Interna-
tional [44]. The ITGA proclaimed a need to ‘‘take into account
the very real impact of [the FCTC] upon farms, their families,
communities and national economies’’ [45] and, in cooperation
with Europe’s International Union of Tobacco Growers (UNI-
TAB), depicted the FCTC as an ‘‘initiative which can have
desastrous [sic] consequences for millions of people in the world,
who depend on tobacco growing for their living’’ [46].
In an attempt to highlight the FCTC’s alleged economic
impacts, BAT tried to alert national governments ‘‘to the costs of a
WHO tobacco police state’’ [47], suggesting that international
organisations can ‘‘take on a life of their own, demanding (and
sometimes wasting) large contributions from taxpayers’’ [48] and
imposing bureaucratic [48] and other ‘‘new burdens on govern-
ments’’ [49].
(2) Developing countries: Depicting tobacco as a high-income country issue.
Notwithstanding the rapidly escalating health and economic
burdens of tobacco use in developing countries [50], this industry
frame depicted tobacco control as an issue primarily of concern to
high-income countries. A key architect of this frame was Roger
Bate, an economist of long-standing tobacco industry affiliation
[51,52,53] and founder of the European Science and Environ-
mental Forum (ESEF), a think-tank that the tobacco industry
sought to establish as a ‘‘scare watchdog’’ [54] and use to raise
debates about scientific evidence [51,54,55]. Bate suggested
Table 2. Tobacco industry tactics to influence the FCTC.
Tactic Related Goals Evidence of Application
Industry FCTC tactics identified through the analysis of corporate documents and a comprehensive literature review
1. Targeting national FCTC delegations
and political actors (via lobbying and
infiltration of organisations and
committees with influence)
N To promote particular ideas and information, attempt to make deals,
and generally influence political processes
N To persuade policymakers that tobacco control proposals conflict with
other, existing legislation (such as trade agreements)
N To infiltrate decision-making bodies and influence political decisions
N To mobilise decision makers with opposing views in order to increase
opposition against tobacco control legislation and influence political
debates and decisions
N To preempt FCTC legislation by passing TTC favoured regulation
with the aim of forestalling or delaying stronger regulation
[12,13,16,17,36,229,230,
237,238,239,240,241,
242,243,244,245]
2. Use of scientists To create doubt and undermine evidence about the negative
impacts of tobacco use and the efficacy of tobacco control measures
[17,233]
3. Enlisting and mobilising allies
(including other industry sectors,
umbrella business organisations,
trade unions, international agencies
and other political actors)
N To enhance the credibility of tobacco industry campaigns
N To create an impression of spontaneous, grassroots public
support for particular (TTC favoured) positions
N To provide advice to TTCs or to lend credibility to positions
favoured by TTCs
[12,16,17,18,36,229,230,233,236]
4. Using stakeholder consultation to
secure industry participation and
delay decisions
N To ensure tobacco TTC participation and representation in
policy discussions
N To facilitate agenda setting and tobacco industry influence
throughout political discussions
N To gain time to frame debates, implement other tactics, and
continue to make profits
[12,16,230,235]
5. Using the media N To influence public opinion
N To promote positions favourable to the industry
[17]
TTC tactics identified through a comprehensive literature review but not evident in our analysis of corporate documents
6. Countering nongovernmental
organisations
To fight and weaken opposition against TTCs, discredit those who
challenged the TTCs’ positions, and divide the tobacco control community
[16,230,241,246,247]
7. Intimidation To use legal and economic power or arguments as a means of
harassing and frightening supporters of tobacco control and
threaten policymakers that they will lose elections
[12,14]
8. Obstructing ratification and effective
implementation of tobacco control
To dilute and neutralise the effect of tobacco control legislation [14,229,238,244,
248,249,250,251,252]
9. Roadshow-type activities To shift the public opinion and debate [17]
10. Achieving joint manufacturing and
licensing agreements and policy
agreements with governments
To form joint ventures with state monopolies to gain market share and
subsequently pressure governments to privatize monopolies
[15,16,230]
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001249.t002
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between LDCs [less-developed countries] and OECD countries
and between public health [i.e. communicable diseases] and
environment [including non-communicable diseases]’’ [56]. He
argued that ‘‘we can divide our opponents and win’’ by showing
them ‘‘where their alleged allies are harming their cause’’ [56].
Bate’s suggestions were positively received at PM [57]. A 1999
book entitled ‘‘Environmental Health: Third World Problems -
First World Preoccupations’’ by Bate and Lorraine Mooney, an
ESEF colleague, argued that communicable diseases were the
primary health problem confronting developing countries and
therefore the most appropriate focus for WHO [58]. Bate
disseminated these claims via the international media, including
in a letter to the Financial Times in October 2000 (coinciding with
the opening of formal FCTC negotiations), in which he claimed
that the FCTC would undermine ‘‘the sovereignty of nations’’ and
called on ‘‘national governments to reject the Convention in its
current form’’ [59].
Such arguments allowed TTCs to portray the FCTC as a
neocolonial initiative that would benefit richer nations at the
expense of poorer ones. For example, BAT’s then-chairman,
Martin Broughton, used a speech at the 1999 World Economic
Forum to redirect public attention to what he termed the ‘‘real
issues in the developing world like malnutrition, sanitation and
infant mortality’’ [60]. Similarly, the German Cigarette Manu-
facturers Association, the Verband der Cigarettenindustrie (VdC),
issued a press statement alleging that WHO’s work towards the
convention demonstrated ‘‘disrespect for the real needs of the poor
of this world’’ [61].
(3) Trade: Claiming conflicts with trade agreements.
TTCs also sought to depict the proposed FCTC as inconsistent
with obligations under existing international agreements, notably
those of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Such arguments
were central to negotiations, and tensions between public health
and trade policies were widely discussed by academics, advocates,
and officials [62,63,64]. Academics argued that FCTC measures
could be adopted without impacting on free trade rules [65], and a
joint report by WTO and WHO in 2002 highlighted that none of
the FCTC proposals were ‘‘inherently WTO-inconsistent’’ [66].
Nevertheless, TTCs and the VdC commissioned multiple legal
analyses of the issue [67,68,69,70] to support their claims that
conflicts between FCTC proposals and existing international trade
agreements existed (the contents of these analyses have largely
been withheld from public disclosure on the basis of attorney-client
privilege) [71]. Internal PM correspondence shows that PM
commissioned the law firm Beveridge and Diamond to ‘‘prepare a
memorandum focusing on the potential trade policy implications
of the Convention [assessing] recent Conventions in other arenas
and identify[ing] instances where WTO or other trade principles
created both jurisdictional and substantive conflicts’’ [69]. A letter
to Andreas Vecchiet (BAT International Political Affairs Manager)
from Crowell & Moring International, an international policy and
regulatory affairs consulting firm, suggests BAT could adopt a
similar strategic approach to manage trade issues [67]. The firm
suggested an analysis of ‘‘the extent to which the proposed
Framework will raise inconsistencies with countries’ WTO
obligations’’ and offered to help BAT to develop ‘‘strategies to
engage trade and agricultural officials’’ in the FCTC negotiations
[67]. BAT subsequently argued that FCTC proposals would
violate international trade laws [72,73], a position supported by
German trade and industry associations [74]. The company
contracted the public affairs firm Prisma to draft ‘‘short and fairly
basic’’ briefing papers to be ‘‘used by ministers (and officials)’’
which would claim that ‘‘WHO provisions contravene articles X,
Y and Z of the WTO’’ [70].
(4) WHO’s mandate: Questioning WHO’s mandate to develop a tobacco
control treaty.
TTCs questioned WHO’s authority and competence to develop
a legally binding international treaty, claiming that tobacco was
‘‘not a ‘cross-border’ problem’’ [24] and so should not be dealt
with at a global level [23]. Although two legal analyses
commissioned by BAT acknowledged that WHO was competent
to negotiate a tobacco control convention [76,77], the company
continued to raise questions about WHO’s mandate [23]. In a
September 1998 correspondence with PM Vice President of
corporate affairs, David Greenberg, Bate successfully proposed a
series of papers to frame debates around WHO’s inadequate
priority setting [56]. Similarly, an analysis by the legal consultancy
firm Rowe and Maw, possibly intended for publication at a
conference on international health policy [104], portrayed several
FCTC proposals as extending ‘‘well beyond the core areas of
authority contemplated by the WHO constitution, raising legal
issues of whether measures taken under the auspices of the WHO
[…] are within the powers of the WHO’’ [75]. BAT further
obtained an analysis of policy implications that could be raised by
countries wanting to dispute WHO’s authority [78].
(5) Good governance: Alleging conflicts with principles of good governance.
A variation on questioning WHO’s mandate was to attack the
FCTC process as infringing principles of ‘‘good governance’’ and
‘‘sensible regulation’’ [23]. BAT used these terms to signify the
company’s preferred mix of nonbinding national agreements and
voluntary measures [79] and to promote policymaking frameworks
which drew attention to business interests [80,81]. The company
used this frame to claim that tobacco industry representatives were
being unfairly excluded from FCTC negotiations [19,39,82,83],
and alleged that this ‘‘unprecedented failure to consult’’ [84] was
contrary to ‘‘good public policy formation’’ [23], neglected some
expert opinions and facilitated biased discussions [78].
(6) Sovereignty: Alleging conflicts with national sovereignty.
BAT also depicted WHO, an international organisation, as
essentially undemocratic [25] and representing a transfer of power
to ‘‘unaccountable and remote elites’’ [24], and described the
FCTC as a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ approach [72], which was ‘‘bound to
fail’’ [75]. This was contrasted against national legislation, which
was depicted as carefully developed and locally sensitive [75]. BAT
sought to persuade WHO member states that the FCTC would
infringe their sovereign rights to legislate in areas of tobacco
control [23]. Accordingly, BAT’s legal department, in cooperation
with the international law firm August and Debouzy [85],
analysed national constitutions to identify conflicts with the FCTC
[86] and subsequently sought to convince governments that
ratifying such a treaty could restrict options for national legislation
[38,84,87].
(7) Corporate social responsibility (CSR): Presenting CSR as an alternative
to a convention.
In line with their broader emphasis on CSR [88,89,90], TTCs
sought to present themselves as responsible corporate citizens
throughout the FCTC process. Such attempts were intended to
achieve three main aims: (i) to raise the companies’ profile [91,92];
(ii) to facilitate access to relevant policymakers and discussions by
improving their perceived credibility [15,93,94]; and (iii) to avoid
strong and binding legislation by presenting self-regulation as an
effective alternative [15]. These aims were promoted via diverse
CSR initiatives, including a conference on eliminating child labour
in tobacco-growing countries organized by BAT, ITGA, and the
International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant,
Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers’ Associations (IUF). The
Global Health Governance and the Commercial Sector
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the UN arena’’ [94] and increase BAT’s ‘‘recognition as a
responsible company’’ [95,96]. The ITGA also publicised grower-
funded programmes to combat AIDS in Africa, hoping to advance
the developing countries frame, refocus attention on other health
issues, and discredit WHO [91]. TTCs also collaborated in
developing a global voluntary code on youth smoking prevention
which was intended to be an alternative to the FCTC [15].
The use of CSR initiatives and voluntary measures aimed to
position TTCs as credible and legitimate stakeholders who
merited inclusion in discussions [90]. Industry documents indicate
that TTCs used commitments to voluntary measures to demon-
strate a willingness to ‘‘participate constructively’’ [97] in
international health policy [25,72,98,99]. While such approaches
seem to have had some success in terms of positioning TTCs as
legitimate stakeholders in national policy debates [90], available
documents do not indicate that they had a substantive impact on
international FCTC negotiations.
(8) Precedent: Depicting the FCTC as setting a precedent for other areas.
BAT also sought to expand the ‘‘threat’’ posed by the FCTC
beyond tobacco, depicting the convention as part of broader,
‘‘worrying anti-business trends that many companies have
identified within the UN and multi-lateral system’’ [100]. BAT
claimed the FCTC could set a dangerous precedent for other
industries [101] and that, in developing the FCTC, the WHO was
‘‘acting as the world’s ‘super nanny’’’ [102]. TTCs further sought
to emphasize the potential ramifications of such an instrument
based in international law for other industries [101,103]. In
February 2000, Rowe and Maw advised BAT ‘‘to expand the
scope of the debate to cover other industries […] and to raise the
debate to a higher level of generality’’ [103]. They suggested
holding a conference on international health policy to debate the
WHO’s mandate (WHO’s mandate frame) and its impact on
national sovereignty in the regulation of alcohol, tobacco, and
pharmaceuticals (sovereignty frame) [104]. A memo in March 2001,
by BAT’s Nicola Shears (formerly of the UK department of trade
and industry [105]), suggests this tactic may have met with some
success, as it reported that ‘‘other sectors are watching the WHO’s
activity with increasing concern over the WHO’s apparent
enthusiasm to become the ‘global health police’’’ [101].
(B) Strategic efforts. TTCs also employed tactics to actively
influence the development of the FCTC, including efforts to
effectively disseminate the frames and arguments outlined above.
We identified five such tactics in our documentary analysis, each of
which is outlined below and a further five tactics in our
comprehensive literature review of publications relating to the
FCTC. All ten tactics are outlined in Table 2.
(1) Targeting national FCTC delegations and political actors. TTCs
targeted the political actors involved in the international FCTC
negotiations, making a particular effort to target actors perceived
to be both powerful and amenable to tobacco industry positions.
An analysis conducted for PM by Mongoven, Biscoe & Duchin
(MBD), a consultancy firm with longstanding links to PM [16],
adopted a classification by Porter et al. [106], categorising national
governments’ position in relation to the FCTC as ‘‘lead states,’’
‘‘supporting states,’’ ‘‘swing states,’’ and ‘‘veto or agenda
weakening states’’ [107]. TTCs subsequently directed their efforts
to states identified as amenable to industry arguments
[21,108,109], agreeing that ‘‘homing in on specific governments
[…] and regions’’ [110] was necessary to ‘‘[m]aintain and enhance
activities of key governments’’ [111]. Within Europe, PM initially
identified Germany, Denmark, Turkey, and France as potentially
supportive [112] but, following intense industry lobbying, the
German [12,113], Spanish [114], Turkish [115,116], and Russian
[117] delegations seemed to emerge as the most useful allies. BAT
documents repeatedly mention these four states as ‘‘key countries’’
[118,119,120] that could help raise concerns about the FCTC
[108].
Building on various frames (e.g., developing countries and trade),
TTCs hoped to create conflicts between delegations by exploiting
varying national interests and mobilising supportive governments
to ‘‘facilitate coalitions of like-minded countries’’ in opposition to
the FCTC [111]. MBD noted that ‘‘proposals can be surfaced
which assist many developing countries but which seriously harm
others. Resolution of such issues is time consuming and often
embittering’’ [107]. Documents indicate that efforts to create
controversy between delegations [107,121] may have had some
impact on the conduct of FCTC negotiations [122,123,124,125],
with Germany and Russia playing prominent roles in these
debates. Germany reportedly exerted influence on European and
Latin American countries to weaken the FCTC [12], while Russia
was seen as capable of influencing other former Soviet Union
countries and of building an alliance with China [126]. During the
discussions of the INB, both Russia and Turkey rejected suggested
measures to give the FCTC precedence over trade agreements in
the event of conflicts arising [123,127].
TTCs also sought to stimulate inter-ministerial conflicts within
governments [12] by encouraging the involvement of economic,
justice, and trade ministries [38,128,129] as well as health
ministries [120]. This tactic, previously used to influence national
and regional tobacco control [14,130,131], aimed to promote less-
stringent, voluntary agreements as viable alternatives to the
convention. Within TTCs, this approach was viewed as successful
in the UK [108], Germany [12], and Japan [13,132] and as an
effective strategy to deflect debates and decisions at supra- and
international levels [12].
A related tactic was to push national governments to implement
weak legislation, in an effort to preempt more stringent regulation
arising from FCTC ratification. Preemption measures apparently
met with some success in Mexico [133] and Argentina [14,134]. In
Argentina, two resolutions were passed following lobbying by the
Argentinean tobacco industry [14] that ensured that no interna-
tional treaty could be signed which would regulate local tobacco
production and consumption [134]. While Argentina signed the
FCTC on 25 September 2003, it has yet to ratify the treaty.
(2) Use of scientists. TTCs engaged scientists to advance their
arguments and frames, an established industry tactic designed to
shape scientific discourse and public opinion [17,43,131,135,136].
In December 1999, Beveridge and Diamond identified the
assessment of the ‘‘possible role of industry experts and academ-
ic/policy fora to shape substantive debate’’ as one action that PM
could take with regard to the FCTC [137]. PM intended to use
scientists and other experts to support several of the frames
outlined above: tensions with national sovereignty (sovereignty
frame), the economic importance of tobacco (economic impacts
frame) [26], and the primacy of other health priorities (developing
countries frame) [56]. The ITGA targeted academics who could be
persuaded to focus on health issues in developing countries
(developing countries frame) [138] and proposed a conference in the
UK to discuss the socioeconomic importance of tobacco (economic
impacts frame) [139]. Roger Scruton, a British conservative
philosopher, was commissioned by Japan Tobacco to denounce
international bureaucracy, with a specific focus on the FCTC (good
governance frame) [140,141,142], and TTCs hired academics to
counter the World Bank’s work and to disseminate research on the
FCTC’s allegedly detrimental economic consequences (economic
impacts frame) [17].
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credibility [90], TTCs attempted to engage the support of diverse
allies from other industry sectors, industry associations, interna-
tional agencies, and several front groups to lend credibility to the
frames and arguments outlined in section A above.
Enabling ‘‘credible third part[ies]’’ to support the campaign
againstthe TobaccoFree Initiative was seen as essential [139] by PM,
since such third parties could ‘‘be more aggressive in opposing [the]
FCTC’’ [26]. One rationale for cooperation amongst TTCs was to
maximise their ability to mobilise non-tobacco allies [111]. Conflicts
did, however, emerge between PM and the other companies [62], as
PM publicly presented itself as a responsible company broadly
sympathetic to the FCTC [98,143], whilst the other TTCs remained
firmly opposed. Indeed, PM’s above-mentioned tactic of enlisting
allies who could militantly oppose the convention is particularly
striking, as it highlights the discrepancy between the company’s
public statements (in which PM emphasised ‘‘common ground’’ with
WHO, public health officials, and proponents of the FCTC [98,143])
and its covert actions.
Other industry sectors: TTCs’ cooperation with retailers
[113,144,145,146,147], and with hospitality [147], advertising
[111] and duty-free [148] industries ensured that the FCTC was
attacked from diverse quarters and perspectives. BAT, for
example, collaborated with international duty-free interest repre-
sentatives (including travel associations and airports) [111] and
advertising associations, using established allies like the Interna-
tional Advertising Association (IAA) [120]. Both sectors made
submissions to the FCTC public hearings with, for instance, the
German Duty Free Confederation reiterating tobacco industry
positions [12,149,150]. The IAA [151] and the German Advertising
Foundation [152] argued that a comprehensive advertising ban
would violate freedom of speech, be unconstitutional, infringe human
rights, and threaten competition [151,152]. A submission by the
Advertising Council of Russia, prepared by BAT Russia [153], also
alleged detrimental economic impacts (economic impacts frame) [154].
Umbrella business organisations: BAT also anticipated benefits from
working with organisations representing broader business interests,
such as the Russian national trade association [153] and the Union of
Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE, now
rebranded BusinessEurope) [70], with whom BAT had previously
collaborated to achieve regulatory change in the EU [81]. BAT
attached particular significance to encouraging the International
Chambers of Commerce (ICC) to voice concerns (see Box 1).
Trade unions and other political actors: TTCs also sought to mobilise
organisations that would appear more independent of the
corporate sector and the tobacco industry, including consumer
groups [120], scientific think-tanks [111], and trade unions
[111,113,120,145]. Trade unions were seen as particularly useful
in endorsing economic arguments regarding employment (economic
impacts frame) and in lobbying ministers, so BAT planned to
approach international umbrella unions, including the ITGA, IUF
[19], and UNITAB [120] to lobby on their behalf. While available
documents do not provide evidence about the specific content of
BAT’s communication with IUF and UNITAB, all three
organisations and the German Union of Food and Allied Workers
(Gewerkschaft Nahrung-Genuss-Gaststa ¨tten) subsequently voiced
concerns about the FCTC either at the international level [155] or
domestically [113,155,156].
BAT used the ITGA particularly intensively in its lobbying
efforts to undermine the FCTC. In a 1999 document, Shabanji
Opukah (then BAT Head of International Development Issues)
explained how he envisaged the relationship between BAT and the
ITGA functioning:
‘‘[T]hey are supposed to be working for us at extreme arms
length […] It is in cases like this that this whole ITGA
relationship should be leveraged for our business advantage
and I always aim at doing that and also ensuring that we are
in the ITGA’s driver’s seat’’ [157].
It was hoped that the ITGA would use discussions and
publications about the economic impact of the FCTC for ‘‘lobbying
goverments[sic] and alliesand briefing mediaon therole of tobacco
in the economy’’ [158] and that it would persuade member states to
request an economic impact assessment of the proposed FCTC,
thereby delaying the treaty [159] (for a detailed assessment of how
and why TTCs believed impact assessments would benefit their
interests, see Smith et al. [80,81]). The ITGA subsequently
recruited scientists, think-tanks [158], and UNITAB [160] in
support of such efforts and targeted the UN Economic and Social
Council [37] and national government and UN representatives in
Geneva [39,114]. The ITGA also commissioned a hostile review of
the World Bank’s work on tobacco control [17,161].
International agencies: Several international organisations and UN
agencies were identified as potential allies, including the UN
Economic and Social Council [120,162], the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) [120,163],
the World Customs Organisation [163], the International Labour
Organisation [120], the Intellectual Property Organisation [120],
the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) [107,120], and
the WTO [120]. UNCTAD was perceived to be potentially
‘‘influential in delivering arguments and messages […] on trade
matters’’ to ministers of employment, agriculture, and trade and to
Box 1. BAT and the ICC
In autumn 1999, Broughton accepted an invitation to join
the ICC UK Governing Body [223]. In its invitation, the ICC
noted that they had past experience of supporting tobacco
companies in the fight against tobacco control [224]. BAT
believed the ICC provided ‘‘a neutral platform,’’ which
would enableBAT‘‘toaccess key stakeholders in the UK and
internationally’’ [225]. The ICC’s status as ‘‘a truly global
body representative of industry views’’ facilitated engage-
ment in debates and lobbying activities at an international
level [223], including in the WTO [225]. In the context of the
FCTC, the ICC was perceived to be an ‘‘an important
stakeholder which we can really leverage if we get it right’’
[226]. BAT hoped that the ICC would act as the ‘‘business
and industry’s ears’’ in FCTC negotiations [227], monitoring
and reporting on its behalf [101]. In an April 2001 meeting
with the ICC Secretary General, Maria Cattaui, Broughton
tried to raise ‘‘the ICC’s awareness of the increasingly
influential reach of the WHO’’ [101] and persuade the ICC to
seek consultative status from the UN so as to represent
corporate interests at the negotiations. A follow-up letter to
this meeting suggested that BAT hoped that the ICC could
facilitate its engagement with other organisations:
‘‘One of the difficulties we face is a lack of awareness
of the responsible face of the tobacco industry. We are
working hard to address this situation and I would be
interested to know if there are any opportunities for
me, or other company members, to represent the ICC
in dialogue with multilateral agencies.’’ [12,100]
BAT reports show that the company enjoyed high-level
access to ICC and illustrate BAT’s hopes to impact the ICC’s
agenda in the context of the FCTC [100,228].
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[120]. The ITGA also explored the potential scope for cooperating
with the FAO on ‘‘academic studies’’ [139]. Although available
documents do not reveal whether such collaboration occurred, both
the ITGA [162] and BAT [164] made reference to a subsequent FAO
economic impact study which helped BAT draw attention to the
economic importance of tobacco production and consumption [164].
Another ally was the International Organization for Standard-
ization (ISO) [165,166], a worldwide umbrella organisation for
national bodies promoting standardisation to facilitate trade [167].
The ISO, represented by a former employee of Imperial Tobacco,
attended INB negotiations and was perceived as a valuable source
of information and access for tobacco companies [12].
Available evidence suggests that TTCs’ efforts to generate
concerns among these agencies may have met with some success.
For example, documents claim that WHO ‘‘met with major
resistance, particularly by the tobacco growing countries’’ when
presenting the framework convention proposal to the UN
Economic and Social Council in July 1999 [168]. A meeting
was subsequently arranged between WHO, WTO, FAO, and
UNCTAD to discuss these matters and WHO was asked to
consider the economic consequences of a convention [168]. A
BAT account of the first session of the INB reported that several
UN agencies had voiced concerns about the WHO convention,
with the FAO appearing ‘‘particularly annoyed’’ [169].
(4) Using stakeholder consultation to secure industry participation and delay
decisions.
Ensuring that their concerns were voiced in FCTC discussions
and negotiations both enabled the TTCs to address stakeholders
and decision-makers and was perceived as a tactic that could delay
the FCTC [170]. From the outset, BAT was concerned about the
‘‘pace with which the WHO process is moving’’ [110] and
engaged PM, RJ Reynolds, Japan Tobacco, and the VdC in
discussions about how to slow it down [110,171]. Delaying the
process was seen as beneficial because it would provide time to
promote arguments against the FCTC and allow ‘‘governments
[…] to consider its implications on jobs and money at a time when
both are under pressure’’ [159]. Requesting an impact assessment
of the proposals [159], further consultation [161,172] and
additional evidence [162,173,174,175] were all means of delaying
the FCTC process [26,102]. In addition, specific FCTC delega-
tions were encouraged to call for more time [170]. While
documents provide no evidence that these tactics were particularly
successful, prior to the second meeting of the FCTC working
group in March 2000, BAT reported that some governments
believed the FCTC process was moving too fast (e.g., Greece and
Turkey), some felt insufficient time had been allowed for
consultation (e.g., the US), and some merely favoured more time
to consider the WHO proposals (e.g., Japan and Russia) [176].
(5) Using the media.
Previous research has highlighted how TTCs have successfully
used journalists and media outlets to advance their political interests
at a national level [177,178,179,180]. Early on intheFCTC process
PM noted that ‘‘[c]ultivating allies […] in the media is a crucial part
of protecting our business’’ [181], and media channels were
subsequently exploited in disseminating several key arguments
[49,138,158,182]. BAT targeted media outlets perceived to be
supportive of free trade [70], including the Wall Street Journal
Europe, where editors gave Broughton the opportunity to write an
op-ed during the FCTC public hearings [183]. The Wall Street
Journal also published an article by ESEF’s Lorraine Mooney
[184,185], focusing on ‘‘WHO’s misplaced priorities’’ [186], which
drew heavily on the developing countries frame. Mooney [186]
lambasted WHO for extending its remit to ‘‘lifestyle’’ rather than
concentrating on ‘‘real’’ health issues. A 2004 Daily Telegraph
article by Bate similarly claimed that WHO’s focus on tobacco and
obesity signalled that the organisation was ‘‘pandering to the desires
of its western (especially European) donors, rather than attending to
the malnourished millions of Africa and Asia’’ and suggested that
WHO ‘‘had lost sight of its mission to save the poorest from easily
preventable and cheaply curable diseases’’ [187].
Discussion
This paper provides the first comprehensive analysis of TTC
tactics to undermine the development of the FCTC. The findings
illustrate the variety and complexity of tobacco industry efforts to
undermine the FCTC and demonstrate the extent to which TTCs
are able to combine and coordinate these approaches on an
international stage. In total, our documentary data enabled us to
identify eight frames developed by TTCs to advance arguments
against the treaty (section A, Results) and five tactics to counter it
(section B, Results), which included diverse efforts to effectively
disseminate the frames. While all but one frame and one tactic
identified in our documentary analysis has been identified in
previously published literature concerning the FCTC, our paper
provides additional evidence of the extent to which these frames
were employed in and adapted to the specific context of the FCTC
negotiations and formed part of a collaborative industry strategy to
undermine global health governance.
Our comprehensive literature review identified a further six frames
and five tactics that were employed by the tobacco industry in their
efforts to influence theFCTC. The 14 frames and ten tactics identified
in the documents do not consistently match the frames and tactics
identified in the literature review which might reflect the primarily
national focus of previous analyses of the negotiations. National case
studies may be more likely to identify frames which were geared to
circumvent the consequences of the FCTC at country level, like the
flexibility or education frame, or which had proven to be particularly
s u c c e s s f u li nt h er e s p e c t i v en a t i o n a lc o n t e x t ,l i k et h epersonal freedoms
frame. By contrast, the frames identified through our documentary
analysis focused more on the globalcontext of the FCTC negotiations,
and hence on industry concerns regarding the distinctive scope of this
initiative. Such concerns are reflected in attacks on the FCTC’s
implications for global health and development (as in highlighting
claimed threats to producer countries and in describing tobacco
control as an issue primarily concerning developed countries) and in
depicting the FCTC as an illegitimate expansion of regulatory scope
(by allegedly compromising trade agreements, impinging on ‘‘good
governance’’ and national sovereignty, exceeding WHO’s mandate,
and setting an unwelcome precedent). One tactic identified in our
literature review for which it is surprising that we did not find further
evidence in our documentary analysis is that of TTCs’ efforts to
counter nongovernmental organisations supporting the development
of the FCTC. This may reflect specific ways in which frames were
defined during the documentary analysis, but also suggests the
difficulties of conducting comprehensive searches in the tobacco
industry archives and points to the limitations inherent in tobacco
document analysis, particularly given the comparatively restricted
availability of documents for this period [188].
All of the frames and tactics we identify as having been used in an
FCTC context have roots in strategies previously deployed by TTCs.
A review of tobacco industry interference with tobacco control
published by WHO in 2008 [43] outlines TTCs’ strategies to try to
prevent, weaken, and otherwise undermine tobacco control policy.
Our findings suggest that in the FCTC context, TTCs focused
particularly on trying to prevent what they perceived to be the
globalisation of tobacco control. Frames depicting international
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principles of good governance, a high-income country concern, and
exceeding WHO’s mandate were identified as particularly suitable
for attacking the emerging FCTC. These frames appear as
adaptations of those that TTCs had previously used in national
and regional contexts (e.g., in debates about EU governance [81] and
about the European Commission’s competence in tobacco control
[12,189,190]) and that were now applied to this distinctive emerging
global challenge. In contrast, a number of tactics which TTCs
employed in other tobacco control contexts (e.g., litigation [43,178,
189,190,191,192,193] and political funding [43,131,191,192,
194,195,196,197]), could not be identified as having been used
againstthe FCTC. This might reflect a perception within the industry
that some strategies are less suited to a global context. The context-
specific adaptation and application of frames reflect the particular
opportunities which arisefor (re-)framing an issue when policymaking
shifts to another venue, i.e., to another institution or level of decision-
making [198] and suggests that TTCs can be expected to continue to
employ and finesse the same strategies to influence policy across
national and international levels.
Considering the success which TTCs enjoyed in framing political
and public debates [9] and employing such tactics to counter
tobacco control policy at a national level [43], it is perhaps
unsurprising that previously used frames and tactics informed
TTCs’ argumentation in the global governance context of the
FCTC. The principal contribution of this paper to the broader
literature on tobacco industry efforts to undermine policy lies in its
demonstration of how the industry was able to draw on experiences,
contacts, frames, and strategies across multiple jurisdictions to
develop and deploy a multi-pronged strategy at a global level. The
comprehensiveness and scale of the tobacco industry’s response to
the FCTC suggests that it is reasonable to speak of a ‘‘globalisation
of tobacco industry strategy’’ in combating the development of
effective tobacco control policies. This highlights the importance of
moving beyond national and local case studies of tobacco industry
influence to develop a greater understanding of the regional and
global dynamics of TTC operations.
The analysis of the TTCs’ fight to prevent, then undermine and
weaken the FCTC can further serve as a case study for research into
how corporate tactics can be employed on a global scale to
undermine the development of international initiatives. These
findings can inform subsequent efforts to develop tobacco control
strategies(includingviatheimplementationoftheFCTC).Arguably,
however, their greater value lies in their broader relevance to the
challenges of developing innovative, international approaches to
combat the global burden of NCDs, including via proposals to
extend the FCTC governance model to other NCDs. The four
leading NCDs (cardiovascular diseases, cancers, chronic respiratory
diseases, and diabetes) account for an estimated 60% of all deaths
globally and, in contrast to the picture painted by TTCs, 80% of this
burden occurs in low- and middle-income countries [199]. These
burdens can be viewed as ‘‘industrial epidemics’’ [200], driven by
commercialinterestsandactivities(e.g.,offood,alcohol,andtobacco
corporations), which require new policy approaches to regulating
health impacts of the commercial sector [201,202].
The broader difficulties confronting WHO and other agencies
in responding to the escalating global burden of NCDs and the
global expansion of the related commercial interests have long
been evident; epitomised, for example, by the efforts of the US
sugar industry to undermine the Global Strategy on Diet, Physical
Activity and Health [203,204], a comparatively modest initiative
[205]. Such difficulties were reiterated in September 2011 at the
UN High Level Meeting on NCDs, which stimulated expressions
of widespread concern about the influence and impacts of the food
and alcohol industries [206,207]. These concerns underline the
importance of finding appropriate approaches for governing
interactions between policymakers and the commercial sector,
and overcoming any political obstacles to achieving policy
coherence between trade and health objectives [208].
Although the arguments and framesanalysed above may often be
dismissed as spurious or cynical when known to originate with the
tobacco industry and considered in the context of public health
evidence, they may nevertheless resonate with, and be advanced by,
actors with greater credibility, legitimacy, and influence within
policy debates. TTCs’ assertions that WHO should focus on
infectious diseases in developing countries, for example, have much
in common with pressures periodically placed on WHO by leading
states including the US and UK [209,210]. The success of the
FCTC initiative [211] strongly attests to the importance of
protecting (and enhancing) WHO’s scope to address NCDs and
to develop bindinglegalinstruments[212].WhileTTCs’ arguments
may not have substantially undermined the FCTC, similar
arguments may have greater leverage in future debates around
strategies to combat NCDs, particularly when advanced by and on
behalf of more credible actors.
Research already documents significant similarities between the
tobacco industry and a variety of other industries, including alcohol
[213,214], food [214,215], oil [216,217], chemical [216,217,218],
and pharmaceuticals [216,218], which further underlines the
potential relevance of the findings in this paper for issues beyond
tobacco control. This is particularly true of alcohol, where the
prospect of a Framework Convention on Alcohol Control is
increasingly being discussed by public health academics [5,219].
The findings could be used to help identify cross-industry counter
arguments and dissemination techniques, including any instances of
the same third parties, scientists, and media outlets being employed.
Indeed, although TTCs do not seem to have been particularly
successful in persuading other sectors that the FCTC was likely to set
a precedent for other areas (i.e. in advancing the precedent frame), this
could change as interest develops in the applicability of the FCTC
model for other areas. Given that transnational corporations appear
to be well placed to jointly develop counterattacks on proposals
relating to global health governance, those who aim to develop
comprehensive, international solutions to these health problems need
to be aware of knowledge transfer and cross-sectoral collaboration.
The lukewarm response to the recent declaration of the UN High
Level Meeting [220,221] attests to the importance of such
approaches, illustrating the scale of political obstacles involved in
combating commercial interests beyond the tobacco industry. This is
starkly evident in the disparity between the declaration’s strong focus
on supporting FCTC implementation and the modest voluntary
strategies envisaged for NCD regulation more broadly [222].
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Background. Every year, about 5 million people die
worldwide from tobacco-related causes and, if current trends
continue, annual deaths from tobacco-related causes will
increase to 10 million by 2030. In response to this global
tobacco epidemic, the World Health Organization (WHO) has
developed an international instrument for tobacco control
called the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(FCTC). Negotiations on the FCTC began in 1999, and the
international treaty—the first to be negotiated under the
auspices of WHO—entered into force on 27 February 2005.
To date, 174 countries have become parties to the FCTC. As
such, they agree to implement comprehensive bans on
tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship; to ban
misleading and deceptive terms on cigarette packaging; to
implement health warnings on tobacco packaging; to
protect people from tobacco smoke exposure in public
spaces and indoor workplaces; to implement taxation
policies aimed at reducing tobacco consumption; and to
combat illicit trade in tobacco products.
Why Was This Study Done? Transnational tobacco
corporations (TTCs) are sometimes described as ‘‘vectors’’
of the global tobacco epidemic because of their drive to
maximize shareholder value and tobacco consumption. Just
like conventional disease vectors (agents that carry or
transmit infectious organisms), TTCs employ a variety of
tactics to ensure the spread of tobacco consumption. For
example, various studies have shown that TTCs have
developed strategies that attempt to limit the impact of
tobacco control measures such as the FCTC. However, to
date, studies investigating the influence of TTCs on the FCTC
have concentrated on specific countries or documented
specific tactics. Here, the researchers undertake a compre-
hensive review of the diverse tactics employed by TTCs to
undermine the development of the FCTC. Such a review is
important because its results should facilitate the effective
implementation of FCTC measures and could support the
development of future tobacco control initiatives and of
global initiatives designed to control alcohol-related and
food-related disease and death.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The researchers
analyzed documents retrieved from the Legacy Tobacco
Documents Library (a collection of internal tobacco industry
documents released as a result of US litigation cases) dealing
with the strategies employed by TTCs to influence the FCTC
alongside data from the websites of industry, consultancy,
and other organizations cited in the documents; the official
records of the FCTC process; and previous studies of tobacco
industry efforts to influence the FCTC. Their analysis reveals
that the strategic response of the major TTCs to the
proposed FCTC was two-fold. First, the TTCs developed a
series of arguments and ‘‘frames’’ (beliefs and ideas that
provide a framework for thinking about an issue) to
challenge the FCTC. Core frames included claiming that the
FCTC would have damaging economic consequences,
questioning WHO’s mandate to develop a legally binding
international treaty by claiming that tobacco was not a cross-
border problem, and presenting corporate social responsi-
bility (the commitment by business to affect the environ-
ment, consumers, employees, and society positively in
addition to making money for shareholders) as an alternative
to the FCTC. Second, the TTCs employed multiple strategies
to promote and increase the impact of these arguments and
frames, such as targeting FCTC delegations and enlisting the
help of diverse allies including media outlets and scientists.
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings illustrate
the variety and complexity of the tobacco industry’s efforts
to undermine the FCTC and show the extent to which TTCs
combined and coordinated tactics on a global stage that
they had previously used on a national stage. Indeed, ‘‘the
comprehensiveness and scale of the tobacco industry’s
response to the FCTC suggests that it is reasonable to speak
of a ‘globalisation of tobacco industry strategy’ in combating
the development of effective tobacco control policies,’’ write
the researchers. Awareness of the strategies employed by
TTCs to influence the FCTC should help guard against
industry efforts to disrupt the implementation of the FCTC
and should support the development of future global
tobacco control initiatives. More generally, these findings
should support the development of global health initiatives
designed to tackle cardiovascular disease, cancer, chronic
respiratory diseases and diabetes – non-communicable
diseases that together account for 60% of global deaths
and are partly driven by the commercial activities of food,
alcohol, and tobacco corporations.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via
the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pmed.1001249.
N The World Health Organization provides information about
the dangers of tobacco (in several languages) and about
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
N For information about the tobacco industry’s influence on
policy, see the 2009 World Health Organization report
‘‘Tobacco interference with tobacco control’’
N The Framework Convention Alliance provides more
information about the FCTC
N The Legacy Tobacco Documents Library is a public,
searchable database of tobacco company internal docu-
ments detailing their advertising, manufacturing, market-
ing, sales, and scientific activities
N The UK Centre for Tobacco Control Studies is a network of
UK universities that undertakes original research, policy
development, advocacy, and teaching and training in the
field of tobacco control
N SmokeFree, a website provided by the UK National Health
Service, offers advice on quitting smoking and includes
personal stories from people who have stopped smoking
N Smokefree.gov, from the US National Cancer Institute,
offers online tools and resources to help people quit
smoking and not start again
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